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CARMICAL v. CRAVEN: DE FACTO RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
In Carmical v. Craven,' decided November 4, 1971, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an unconstitutional exclusion of
blacks from jury service had been shown despite the absence of in-
tentional discrimination. The court ruled that an ostensibly neutral
intelligence test which excluded a disproportionate number of blacks
constituted a denial of equal protection when it was established that
the test had not been reasonably related to the selection of competent
jurors. The fact that the test, which had subsequently been proven
invalid, had been devised and administered in good faith was held to
be no defense.
The decision in Carmical is an additional link in a chain of
evolving case law holding that tests or other procedures which un-
justifiably discriminate against blacks or other identifiable classes need
not be motivated by ill will in order to be unconstitutional. 2  The
direct effect of the decision is to place county jury officials on notice
that they must examine their jury selection procedures to insure that
a disproportionate number of blacks, or members of some other identi-
fiable class, are not excluded, and that only fairly applied criteria rele-
vant to the selection of competent jurors are utilized in the selection
procedures. Further, where a prima facie showing of racial exclusion
has been made, the state cannot justify the jury selection procedures
merely by showing bona fide, nondiscriminatory intentions.
The indirect effect of the decision may be to force jury officials to
guarantee that the selection procedures result in jury panels which
approximate the racial populations in the surrounding community, in
order to minimize the risk of having what is believed to be a proper
test later declared invalid on the basis that it failed to accurately mea-
sure relevant selection criteria. Since convictions obtained at the hands
of improperly selected juries are subject to collateral attack, jury offi-
cials may well conclude that the only selection process which is con-
stitutionally "safe" is one which produces racially balanced juries.
Whether this in fact is the result of Carmical, the Ninth Circuit appears
to have taken a major step in its implementation of the constitutional
objective that the jury fairly represent the community.
1. 451 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971), petition for rehearing filed June 13, 1971.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 65 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 924 (1963); and cases discussed in notes 20 & 21 infra.
The Decision in Carmical v. Craven
In 1966 Richard Carmical was convicted 3 of possession of heroin4
and illegal possession of a firearm. 5 At the time of his trial in Oak-
land, California, a "clear thinking" test was used to select a master
jury panel from voter registration lists.6 The test was ostensibly de-
signed to eliminate voters who failed to satisfy California's statutory
requirement that a juror be "[imn possession of his natural faculties
and of ordinary intelligence and not decrepit."' 7  The test consisted of
twenty-five multiple-choice questions which were to be answered in
ten minutes.8  Prospective jurors were not advised of the ten minute
time limit before they took the test and were required to answer cor-
rectly 80 percent of the questions in order to qualify for the master
jury panel.'
In 1968, two years after Carmical's conviction, the Alameda
County superior court prohibited further use of the intelligence test
on the specific grounds that the test had eliminated prospective jurors
on some basis other than "ordinary intelligence."'1  Carmical then
3. Carmical's conviction was affirmed in People v. Carmical, 258 Cal. App. 2d
103, 65 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1968).
4. See CAL. HEALTH S. CODE § 11500 (West 1964), as amended (Supp.
1971).
5. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 12021 (West 1970), as amended (Supp. 1971) (con-
victed felon or addicted user of narcotics in possession of a firearm).
6. 451 F.2d at 401.
7. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 198(2) (West 1954). For a list of jury selection
statutes in other states see Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 333-34 & nn. 27-33
(1970).
8. 451 F.2d at 402.
9. Id. In a footnote to the opinion, Judge Hufstedler wrote the following:
"'Correct' answers were those supplied by the manufacturer of the test. We use 'cor-
rect' pejoratively because we cannot describe as 'right' any of the choices given for
some of the questions asked. Here are three samples from the test:
"'4. Why is a man superior to a productive machine?
1. A man has a sense of humor.
2. A man can think.
3. A machine requires repairs.'
"'23. If a person asks you for something you do not have, you should:
1. Tell him to mind his own business.
2. Say you don't have it.
3. Walk away.'
" '25. If it rains when you are starting to go for the doctor, should you:
1. Stay at home.
2. Take an umbrella.
3. Wait until it stops raining.'"
Id. at 402 n.1.
10. People v. Craig, No. 41750 (Alameda County Super. Ct., Apr. 18, 1968).
Since 1968 Alameda County has not replaced the test with any equivalent pro-
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petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, charging
that his conviction was invalid because he had been tried by a jury
drawn from a jury panel unconstitutionally selected."1
In his petition for habeas corpus Carmical alleged that during
the second half of 1967, 81.5 percent of the registered voters from
predominantly black and low income areas of Alameda County who
had taken the test failed to pass it, as opposed to only 14.5 percent of
those from predominantly white areas."2 Further, his petition alleged
that a total of 29 percent of all persons tested had failed, and at the
time of his prosecution in 1966, white voters were four times as likely
to pass the test as were voters from black and low income areas.' 3
The district court denied the petition, inter alia, on the basis
that there had been no showing of "purposeful exclusion from jury
service because of race."' 4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
denial of the petition, holding that intentional discrimination need not
be shown and that unjustifiable discrimination in fact constituted a de-
nial of equal protection. Judge Hufstedler, writing for the court,
stated:
When a jury selection system actually results in master jury
panels from which identifiable classes are grossly excluded, the
subjective intent of those who develop and enforce the system
is immaterial.' 5
The court went on to state that a plaintiff can present a prima facie
case of unconstitutional discrimination by showing that a jury selection
process excludes a grossly disproportionate number of persons belong-
cedure; names are now selected at random from voter registration lists by computer.
A challenge based on subordinary intelligence could, of course, be posed on voir dire.
11. 451F.2d at 401.
12. Id. at 402.
13. Id.
14. Carmical v. Craven, 314 F. Supp. 580, 584 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 451
F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971).
15. 451 F.2d at 404. Judge Hufstedler's opinion stressed that, "[tihe object of
the constitutional mandate is to produce master jury panels from which identifiable
community classes have not been systematically excluded. The object is neither to
reward jury commissioners with good motives nor to punish those with bad intentions."
Id. The only requirement of intent in this effect-oriented approach is that the prac-
tice having a discriminatory effect be engaged in deliberately, as distinguished from
an accidental occurrence. "If one factor is uniform in a continuing series of events
that are brought to pass through human intervention, the law would have to have the
blindness of indifference rather than the blindness of impartiality not to attribute the
uniform factor to man's purpose. The purpose may not be of evil intent or in conscious
disregard of what is conceived to be a binding duty. Prohibited conduct may result
from misconception of what duty requires." Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 293
(1950) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); cf. note 20 infra.
April 1972]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ing to a particular race or class, and that such a showing is sufficient
without the necessity of further alleging or proving bad faith on the
part of the state. The court concluded that once a prima facie show-
ing of continuous racial imbalance has been made, the burden is on
the state to show that such disparity is the result of a selection process
which in fact measures relevant, nonracial factors. 16
Basis for the Decision
The court in Carmical acknowledged that "almost all" of the
cases in which the United States Supreme Court had declared jury
selection systems unconstitutional involved selection methods which
were specifically designed to exclude blacks from jury service. 17 How-
ever, the court continued, this was merely due to the historical preva-
lence of intentional discrimination against blacks in the jurisdictions
where the cases arose, and the Supreme Court had never implied that
a showing of intentional discrimination was indispensible to proving
a denial of equal protection.' 8  "Rather. the Court has charged state
officials with an affirmative duty to seek, and include within the jury
selection process, all persons qualified under state law."' 9
Since the "clear thinking" test used to select Alameda County
jurors had been found to measure traits other than ordinary intelli-
gence, individuals who had been eliminated from the venire for having
failed the test had been improperly excluded on the basis of criteria
not reasonably related to the selection of competent jurors. Since the
invalid selection process had excluded a grossly disproportionate number
of black voters, equal protection had been denied the petitioner.
21
16. See text accompanying notes 42-54 infra.
17. 451 F.2d at 403, citing, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)
(segregated tax returns); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (judges inter-
viewed prospective jurors); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (segregated jury
tickets); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (jury commissioners failed to search out
qualified blacks); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (blacks placed last on jury
lists); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883) (blacks excluded by law); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (blacks presumed incompetent to serve as jurors).
18. 451 F.2d at 403.
19. Id.
20. The Supreme Court used a similar line of reasoning in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), an employment case arising under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Griggs black employees challenged the requirement of
a high school education or passing a standardized intelligence test as a condition of
employment or promotion to better jobs. The Court held these requirements were
unlawful despite the absence of discriminatory intent, since the requirements excluded
a disproportionate number of black employees and the requirements were not shown
to be job related. Mr. Chief Justice Burger's opinion emphasized that the Civil
Rights Act "does not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group."
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The court of appeals noted, however, that proof of intentional
discrimination in the selection process might be required if the ex-
clusion of a particular class
is not gross enough unequivocally to establish discrimination.
Evidence that the system was designed to discriminate invidi-
ously may add enough strength to such statistical data to make
out a prima facie case. 21
The holding in Carmical, though of obvious constitutional signifi-
cance, is really quite narrow. The decision does not, on its face,
require the percentage of blacks represented on jury panels to approxi-
mate the percentage they represent in the general population. Nor
does the decision imply that an intelligence test is not a proper screen-
ing device for prospective jurors. 2 The holding in Carmical appears
to be confined to the proposition that if an intelligence test is used, it
must in fact measure intelligence relevant to the selection of competent
jurors thereby providing those of equal intelligence an equal opportun-
ity to serve as jurors-regardless of their race. In other words, the
But, the opinion continued, "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id.
at 430-31, 432 (emphasis added).
The holding is especially significant in view of the fact that Chief Justice Burger
concluded that no discriminatory intent was necessary by relying on a statute which
appears aimed specifically at intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(h) (1970). But cf. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970), in which the court held invalid an employer's policy of not hiring persons
with arrest records on the basis that statistically, blacks were shown to be arrested
more frequently than whites. "An intent to discriminate is not required to be shown so
long as the discrimination shown is not accidental or inadvertent. The intentional use
of a policy which in fact discriminates between applicants of different races and
can reasonably be seen so to discriminate, is interdicted by the statute [Civil Rights
Act], unless the employer can show a business necessity for it. In this context
'business necessity' means that the practice or policy is essential to the safe and efficient
operation of the business." Id. at 403; see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1669-79 (1969).
21. 451 F.2d at 404-05. "In short, subjective intent may be relevant to prove
that a particular system is invidiously discriminatory, but that evidence is not an ele-
ment of the constitutional test." Id. at 405.
22. The court noted the decisions in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320
(1970), and Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), in which the Supreme Court
approved the use of intelligence or education as a criterion for jury service. 451
F.2d at 405. The court rejected the state's reliance on these decisions, however, on
the basis that the Alameda County "clear-thinking" test had been found to not meas-
ure intelligence. Id. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 473 (1953): "States
should decide for themselves the quality of their juries as best fits their situation so
long as the classifications have relation to the efficiency of the jurors and are equally
administered." (emphasis added)
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decision imposes no explicit requirement that a particular jury panel-
or, a fortiori, the jury itself-reflect the racial proportions in the sur-
rounding population. Instead, the court seems to say that a jury
panel which does not reflect the racial population in the surrounding
community must not be the product of a selection process which-
intentionally or inadvertently-makes such a distortion more likely
than not. In short, the decision signifies that continuous gross under-
representation of blacks on jury panels can only be justified by the
state by showing that nonracial factors produced the disparity.
Carmical In Historical Perspective
Racial discrimination in jury selection has been held unconstitu-
tional since 1880,23 when the United States Supreme Court, under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments held that the jury selection
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were constitutional.24 The
wording of the act made clear that its primary purpose was to ensure
the right of recently emancipated blacks to serve as jurors. Of course,
most of the cases decided since the act have involved total or near-
total exclusion of blacks over an extended period of time.25
The United States Supreme Court has held that the prohibition
against class exclusion applies to all races,26 or other identifiable
classes,- and not only is exclusion on the basis of race proscribed but
23. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
24, Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336, codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 243 (1970): "No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be
prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court
of the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty
in the selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for
such cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000."
25. See, e.g., Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 464 (1947) (total exclusion of
blacks for more than 30 years); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359 (1939)
(no blacks on grand or petit juries for 40 years); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
591 (1935) (no blacks called for jury service for "a long number of years"); Bush v.
Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883) (blacks excluded by law); cf. Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954) (systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans).
26. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954) (no evidence that
Mexican or Latin-American surnamed person had ever served as jury commissioner, or
grand or petit juror for 25 years). See generally Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: Tile
Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 235, 238-39 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kuhn], for
a comprehensive and penetrating analysis of racial and other types of discrimination
in jury selection. See also Note, The Jury: A Reflection of Prejudice in the Com-
munity, 20 HASTINGs L.J. 1417 (1969).
27. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1968) (prohibiting
exclusion of persons voicing general objections or conscientious or religious scruples
against the death penalty); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946)
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so is any other restriction or limitation on the basis of race.28  On the
other hand, the courts have consistently held that mere token inclusion
fails to satisfy the equal protection requirement of the constitution,
2 9
and they have also consistently held that the defendant has no right
to have a member of his own race included on the jury that tries him.s°
Whenever the selection process is found to have unconstitutionally ex-
cluded members of a particular class or race, prejudice to the defendant
is conclusively presumed by the court.31 Further, the courts have held
that all those who may have been unconstitutionally excluded from
jury service because of race have standing to challenge the selection
system being used.32
What tests should be utilized by the courts to determine whether
there has been systematic exclusion of a particular group from jury
service,33 so as to violate the constitutional right to trial by an im-
(prohibiting blanket exclusion of daily wage earners from federal jury lists). But see,
e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), upholding a Florida statute requiring
women to register for jury service, even though in the year female petitioner was con-
victed of the second degree murder of her husband, only 220 women had registered
out of some 46,000 registered women voters. The Court suggested a different result
might have been reached had the alleged exclusion been racial. Id. at 68. See
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (upholding New York's "blue ribbon" jury
system).
28. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950).
29. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 471 (1953), citing Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940).
30. See, e.g., Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 323 (1880): "A mixed jury in a particular case is not essential to the
equal protection of the laws. . . ."; People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 390-91,
87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 414-15 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); Fay v. New
York, 332 U.S. 261, 300 (1947) (dissenting opinion): "We can never measure
accurately the prejudice that results from the exclusion of certain types of qualified
people from a jury panel. Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible, that it escapes the
ordinary methods of proof. . . ." And in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 301-02
(1950), Mr. Justice Jackson wrote in a dissenting opinion: "It is obvious that dis-
criminatory exclusion of Negroes from a trial jury does, or at least may, prejudice a
Negro's right to a fair trial, and that a conviction so obtained should not stand. The
trial jury hears the evidence of both sides and chooses what it will believe. In so
deciding, it is influenced by imponderables-unconscious and conscious prejudices and
preferences-and a thousand things we cannot detect or isolate in its verdict and whose
influence we cannot weigh. A single juror's dissent is generally enough to prevent a
conviction. A trial jury on which one of the defendant's race has no chance to sit may
not have the substance, and cannot have the appearance, of impartiality, especially
when the accused is a Negro and the alleged victim is not."
32. E.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970): "People excluded
from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by
juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion."
33. The constitutional standards controlling the selection of grand or petit jurors
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partial jury, has never been too well defined. 4 On the one hand,
the Supreme Court has declared that basic concepts of a democratic
government require that a jury should be "truly representative of the
community."3 5  On the other hand, the Court has also held that "pro-
portional representation" is not required. 6 In a similar context, the
Court has suggested that jury composition must be the product of
either "the operation of an honest exercise of relevant judgment or
the uncontrolled caprice of chance."37
The underlying rationale of the Court in applying these princi-
ples appears to be the following assumption: if an accurate, objectively
administered selection process is utilized which measures only relevant
data, the result should be racially representative juries.38  In other
words, if voters of ordinary intelligence are eligible to serve as jurors,
the assumption seems to be that a test which does in fact measure
such intelligence would, in the long run of cases, produce jury panels
which reflect the racial proportion of the surrounding population.3 9
are the same. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 362 (1939). For cases involving
alleged exclusion from grand jury service see, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1963) (per curiam); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Rogers v. Alabama,
192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Bush v. Kentucky,
107 U.S. 110 (1883). Alleged exclusion from petit jury service: Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935) (per curiam).
Alleged exclusion from both grand and petit jury service: Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Coleman v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 129 (1964); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hale v. Kentucky,
303 U.S. 613 (1938) (per curiam); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Martin v.
Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
34. People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 749-50, 278 P.2d 9, 15 (1954), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 875 (1955).
35. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
36. E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965): "Neither the jury roll
nor the venire need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the
proportionate strength of every identifiable group. 'Obviously the number of races and
nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our citizens would make it impossible to
meet a requirement of proportional representation.... .. citing Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950).
37. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 291 (1950).
38. "Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are
to be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather
than a group or a class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system.
To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which
are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury." Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
39. This, of course, may be an incorrect assumption where a history of dis-
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The court in Carmical appears to have reasoned as follows: (1)
the criteria utilized in the selection process must be reasonably related
to the selection of competent jurors; (2) if such criteria are proper,
then according to the "laws of chance", they should, on average, pro-
duce representative jury lists; (3) therefore, continually unrepresenta-
tive jury lists render the selection criteria suspect.40
A broader, more difficult question than the validity of a specific
intelligence test, which has necessarily been raised by the Carmical de-
cision, is whether any selection process which continually produces
racially imbalanced jury lists should not only be suspect but invalid
per se. Given the premise, often stated by the courts, that the se-
lection process should insure that the jury represent a cross section of
the community in order to meet the constitutional requirements, the
question arises whether any selection process can ever be justified if
it consistently fails to attain this constitutional objective.41
What is Unrepresentative?: The Prima Facie Rule
As previously mentioned, the early cases in which jury selection
systems were challenged as unconstitutional, generally involved express
statutory exclusion of blacks from jury duty.42 Once these particular
statutes were held to be unconstitutional, the next target for the courts
were selection procedures which, though neutral on their face, were
utilized in a discriminatory manner.43  As a general rule, and in the
absence of contrary evidence, the state is presumed to have selected
jurors fairly and without discrimination, and the burden of proof on
the issue of discrimination is on the litigant attacking the jury selection
process. 44 However, because of the constitutional character of the
rights involved and because of the practical difficulties of proof faced
by an individual alleging either specific acts of discrimination or actual
discriminatory intent on the part of the state in its selection of jurors,
crimination has left a particular segment of society underqualified. See, e.g., Gaston
County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1969); Kuhn, supra note 26, at
274-75, 303-22. In Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), the Court reserved the
question "whether a State that for years has provided separate and inferior schools for
Negroes may now disqualify them on the 'impartial' ground of educational inade-
quacy, however defined." Id. at 361 n.22; cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19
(1956).
40. See text accompanying notes 42-54 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 61-79 infra.
42. See, e.g., Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
43. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1970).
44. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965); Tarrance v. Florida,
188 U.S. 519, 520 (1903).
April 19721
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the courts have developed what has come to be known as the "prima
facie rule." This rule provides that
where there is a striking disparity between the proportion of
Negroes chosen for jury duty and the proportion of Negroes
in the eligible population, the burden is on the state to rebut
the presumption that discrimination has been the cause. 45
A prima facie case of racial discrimination, however, is not made
simply by showing that a particular jury list contained no members of
a particular class. The courts have generally required the litigant to
show that the exclusion was sufficiently long-continued so as to make
improbable the operation of chance as a cause of the disparity.4 6 Thus,
the prima facie rule does not require that a particular defendant be
guaranteed a jury racially representative of the surrounding community.
Instead, the rule is merely an evidenciary device on which the courts
allow a litigant to rely because the state has greater access to specific,
explanatory evidence.47 The rationale of the courts in applying the
prima facie rule is simply that where statistical evidence offered by a
litigant asserting racial discrimination suggests a strong possibility of
systematic exclusion, the state should be called upon to rebut the in-
ference that consideration of racial factors caused the disparity.
No satisfactory generalization can be made as to the quantum of
evidence sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the state, since the
courts have varied greatly in their determinations that the disparity
was sufficient to justify application of the prima facie presumption.
The majority of cases decided by the Supreme Court have involved
total or near-total exclusion of blacks from jury service over an ex-
tended period of time,48 and thus there was little difficulty in inferring
discrimination; where such a showing stood unrebutted by the state,
45. Kuhn, supra note 26, at 251. See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 471
(1953); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 405 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131
(1940); United States v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 67 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 924 (1963); Kuhn, supra note 26, at 251-57.
46. "Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain
class will serve on a particular jury or during some particular period. But it taxes our
credulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no members of this class
among the over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years." Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954); "Chance and accident alone could hardly have brought
about the listing for grand jury service of so few negroes from among the thousands
shown by the undisputed evidence to possess the legal qualifications for jury serv-
ice." Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131 (1940).
47. "The defendant is a party to one proceeding only, and his access to relevant
evidence is obviously limited. The State is a party to all criminal cases and has
greater access to the evidence, if any, which would tend to negative the State's in-
volvement in discriminatory jury selection." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 240
(1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
48. See, e.g., cases cited in note 25 supra.
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the inference of discrimination was controlling. However, in cases
involving only partial exclusion, the courts have differed as to the
propriety of applying the prima facie rule. Of course, in such cases
there is a greater possibility that chance-unaffected by racial factors-
could account for the disproportionate exclusion.
For example, in Brown v. Allen49 the Court ruled that no prima
facie case had been shown where 16 percent of the eligible population
was black, and the petitioner produced statistics showing that recent
grand and petit juries were from 7 to 17 percent black. However,
in Speller v. Allen,50 one of the cases consolidated with Brown, the
Court decided that a prima facie showing of racial discrimination had
been made where the eligible population was 38 percent black and the
petitioner showed that only 7 percent of the jury panels had been
black. The petitioner was ultimately unsuccessful, however, because
the state successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination raised
by the racial statistics.
If the cases decided by the Supreme Court disclose any discern-
able trend, it would appear to be in favor of finding a prima facie
case, and a less rigid requirement as to the disparity actually proved.
For example, in Whitus v. Georgia51 27 percent of those eligible for
jury service were black, while only 9 percent of the grand jury venire
and slightly less than 8 percent of the petit jury venire were black.
The Court held that these statistics, together with the fact that juror's
names were selected from segregated tax lists, were sufficient to form
a prima facie case. In a footnote the Court in Whitus applied statistical
theory to the disparity and noted that, given the racial composition of
the community, "the mathematical probability of having seven Negroes
on a venire of 90 is .000006.252
More recently, in Turner v. Fouche5" Mr. Justice Stewart found
a prima facie case on the basis of a statistical disproportion which
showed that though the county population was 60 percent black, only
37 percent of those selected for the grand jury panel were black, and
he stated:
In the absence of countervailing explanation by the [state], we
cannot say that the underrepresentation reflected in these figures
is so insubstantial as to warrant no corrective action by a fed-
eral court charged with the responsibility of enforcing consti-
tutional guarantees. 54
49. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
50. Id. at 477 (1953).
51. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
52. Id. at 552 n.2. See generally Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical
Decisions Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HiAv. L. Rav. 338 (1966).
53. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
54. Id. at 359.
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Rebutting the Presumption Raised by the
Prima Facie Rule
A remaining question, which goes to the heart of the Carmical
decision, is the evidence which must be produced by the state to
rebut the presumption raised under the prima facie rule. The courts
have long held that mere assertions of good faith by jury officials are
insufficient to rebut the presumption of discrimination, and without
more, the courts will deem the statistics as conclusive.5 5 Carmical
appears to go further in that even uncontroverted good faith was re-
jected by the court as a sufficient explanation of long-continued racial
imbalance. Of course, such a conclusion in Carmical would appear to
be consistent with the Supreme Court's position that "[i]f there has
been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously,
the conviction cannot stand.""
However, under a more restrictive interpretation, the Carmical
holding may be read to imply that the state could have overcome the
presumption by proving that the statistical disparity resulted from the
operation of legitimate selection factors unrelated to race. Under this
view the opinion may suggest that had the state been able to demon-
strate that the intelligence test did in fact measure average intelligence,
rather than cultural factors, then the same disproportionate exclusion
of blacks might have been justified. 7  Of significance, however, is
the fact that the only issue properly before the Carmical court was
whether a showing of intentional discrimination was essential for find-
ing a prima facie case." Because the question decided by the court
55. "If, in the presence of such testimony as defendant adduced, the mere gen-
eral assertions by officials of their performance of duty were to be accepted as an
adequate justification for the complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the
constitutional provision [Fourteenth Amendment]-adopted with special reference to
their protection-would be but a vain and illusory requirement." Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935); accord, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361 (1970);
Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-8 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
481-2 (1954); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1940).
56. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
57. Carmical's brief seems to both accept and reject such a conclusion: compare
Brief for Appellant at 20, Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399, 403 (9th Cir. 1971):
"Petitioner wishes to reiterate that his position is not that the mere exclusion of per-
sons who are truly 'unintelligent' from jury duty, violates the Fourteenth Amendment
simply because that exclusion results in a non-representative jury list." with id. at 13:
"Thus, the duty of the state is not merely negative, i.e. not to deliberately exclude
blacks, but is affirmatively to constitute its jury lists so that they reasonably approxi-
mate a cross-section of the community and in fact represent the community from
which the defendant comes. This does not mean, of course, that every jury must meet
some quota; it mea-s simply that the jury selection system must produce the required
representation in the general run of cases."
58. Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399, 403 (9th Cir. 1971).
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was so narrow, it is perhaps more instructive to consider the court's
opinion in terms of its probable future impact, rather than simply to
limit the discussion to the actual holding.
The practical impact of Carmical, which may perhaps have been
intended by the court, may be to require a jury selection system which
will produce jury panels fairly representing a cross-section of the com-
munity. Even if it were assumed that persistent racial imbalance
could be justified by showing that nonracial factors produced the dis-
parity, the uncertainty as to what would be deemed to be a "nonracial"
factor, and the concomittant difficulty of singling out such factors in
a particular case would be enormous. Faced with such an insur-
mountable task, jury officials may well utilize tests or criteria for jury
service which deliberately insure at least enough of a racial representa-
tion on jury panels to avoid the possible invocation of a prima facie
case of discrimination by the courts. Unless such deliberate action is
taken, jury officials-whose selection process produces racially im-
balanced jury panels-would face the continuing contingency that at
some future date the selection process would be declared unconstitu-
tional by the court, and that convictions obtained under juries chosen
by such a process would be open to collateral attack.5 9
Would such a deliberate selection-whether intended or not by
the Carmical court-be justifiable? If so, statistics which reveal a
continuing racial imbalance do not simply create a presumption
of discrimination to be rebutted by the jury commissioners; they
conclusively establish that the selection system is defective, be-
cause they show that the system, whether so intended or not, in
fact tends to exclude Negroes. 60
In other words, under such a cross-section requirement, there is little
possibility that any evidence would be sufficient to justify continuous,
gross underrepresentation of blacks on jury lists.
The Jury Composed of a "Cross-Section"
of the Community
The idea that a jury should be a body composed of a cross-
section of the surrounding community has been long recognized, even
59. This, of course, is the result of Carmical, since Alameda used the "clear-
thinking" test from 1954 to 1968. "[A] conviction cannot stand which is based on an
indictment found by a grand jury from which Negroes were kept because of dis-
crimination." Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); however, "[a] prisoner whose conviction is reversed by this Court need not
go free if he is in fact guilty, for Texas may indict and try him again by the pro-
cedure which conforms to constitutional requirements." Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400,
406 (1942); accord, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 553 (1967).
60. Kuhn, supra note 26, at 265.
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though not always effectively implemented, by the courts. The Su-
preme Court has applied the cross-section requirement to federal juries
in both racial and socio-economic contexts6 but has apparently applied
such a requirement to state court juries only in cases involving racial
exclusion. In Smith v. Texas6 2 which involved selection of the jury
in a state court, Justice Black said:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as
instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly repre-
sentative of the community. For racial discrimination to result
in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups
not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under
it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society
and a representative government.63
And, in Glasser v. United States,64 Mr. Justice Murphy cautioned the
federal courts:
[Federal jury selection officials] must not allow the desire for com-
petent jurors to lead them into selections which do not com-
port with the concepts of the jury as a cross-section of the
community. Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selec-
tion of jurors by any method other than a process which will
insure trial by a representative group are undermining processes
weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily
resisted. That the motives influencing such tendencies may be
of the best must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any
encroachment whatsoever on this essential right. Steps inno-
cently taken may, one by one, lead to the irretrievable impair-
ment of substantial liberties. 65
To further encourage the implementation of this ideal-the truly
representative jury-the Court has imposed on jury officials an affirm-
ative duty to become acquainted with the significant racial elements in
the community in order that they may be included within the selection
process, rather than deliberately or inadvertently excluded. 66  The
61. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86, rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 827 (1942).
62. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
63. Id. at 130.
64. 315 U.S. 60, rehearing denied, 315 U.S. 827 (1942).
65. Id. at 86; the Supreme Court's supervisory power is not limited by the Four-
teenth Amendment, but the federal decisions repeatedly rely on Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128 (1940), a state exclusion case. Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474
(1952): "Our duty to protect the federal constitutional rights of all does not mean
we must or should impose on states our conception of the proper source of jury lists,
so long as the source reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in
character and intelligence for that civic duty."; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,
355 (1970).
66. "The Jury Commissioners, and the other officials responsible for the selec-
tion of this panel, were under a constitutional duty to follow a procedure-'a course
of conduct'-which would not 'operate to discriminate in the selection of jurors on
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Court has consistently insisted that both state and federal officials re-
sponsible for jury selection develop and follow procedures or conduct
"which would not 'operate to discriminate in the selection of jurors
on racial grounds.' ",67 By imposing the requirement that jury officials
familiarize themselves with the major racial segments in the commun-
ity, the Court has not implicitly condoned proportional representation.68
The Court has, however, encouraged jury officials to be color-conscious
in order to develop systems which will result in a representative cross-
section of the community being placed on jury rolls. 9
A point which should not be ignored is that the uniform applica-
tion of legitimate selection criteria may still result in the dispropor-
tionate exclusion of a particular group. For example, in Carmical
the state had argued that the real reason for the high percentage of
blacks failing the intelligence test was that they had probably received
less formal schooling as a racial group and were therefore less familiar
with the test-taking process.70  Does the court-approved color-con-
sciousness principle which is inherent in the cross-section requirement
racial grounds.' Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942). If they failed in that
duty, then this conviction must be reversed-no matter how strong the evidence of
petitioner's guilt. That is the law established by decisions of this Court spanning
more than seventy years of interpretation of the meaning of 'equal protection."'
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561 (1953); accord, Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,
289 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 399 (1945); Salary v. Wilson, 415 F.2d
467, 472 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 65 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 924 (1963).
67. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561 (1953), quoting Hill v. Texas, 316
U.S. 400, 404 (1942).
68. Justice Douglas seems to be the only member of the Court advocating
proportional representation. In his dissenting opinion in Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320 (1970), he wrote: "I cannot see any solution to the present problem,
unless the jury commission is by law required to be bi-racial. In the Kingdom of
Heaven, an all-white or an all-black commission could be expected to do equal justice to
all races in the selection of people 'generally reputed to be honest and intelligent'
and 'esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judg-
ment."' Id. at 342. "Where the challenged state agency, dealing with the rights and
liberties of the citizen, has a record of racial discrimination, the corrective remedy is
proportional representation. Under our Constitution that would indeed seem to be the
only effective control over the type of racial discrimination long practiced in this
case." Id. at 345.
69. See, e.g., Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 975 (1967); cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920,
931-32 (2d Cir. 1968), a case involving alleged discrimination in housing: "What we
have said may require classification by race. That is something which the Constitution
usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an impermissible classification, but be-
cause it is one which usually, to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose
of maintaining racial inequality. Where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equal-
ity it will be allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by
race, it will be required." (emphasis added).
70. Brief for Appellee at 11, Carmical v. Craven, 451 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971).
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permit compensatory selection procedures in order to ensure that the
cross-section ideal is realized? The answer would seem to be that if
the principle of cross-section representation is to become a reality,
compensatory selection procedures would not only be permissible but
required. Such an approach parallels the approaches taken by the
courts in other areas involving fundamental rights, such as voting and
employment, where a history of intentional discrimination has left
blacks economically or educationally underqualified. In such cases,
the courts have often held invalid ostensibly objective tests which re-
sulted in perpetuating the effects of past discrimination.7'
Obviously, a selection system which is aimed at compensating for
disadvantages peculiar to a particular class should not ignore the fact
that properly qualified jurors are essential to a workable judicial sys-
tem. The proper answer would not appear to be the lowering of
suitability standards to a point which jeopardizes the quality of the
jury but to include a larger percentage of the class of persons who
tend to be excluded at a disproportionately higher rate under whatever
test or selection criteria are utilized. By giving the test to more in-
dividuals in the particular class, more of them should survive the selec-
tion process.7 2  If, for example, twice as many blacks as whites fail
the selection process, then twice as many blacks should be considered.
Under this type of a procedure, neither the competence of the jury,
nor the ideal of the jury as a body representative of the community is
sacrificed, because only qualified members of the various classes would
be selected.
The most far-reaching decisions in the area of jury selection have
come from the Fifth Circuit, where the courts have had many cases
before them involving the issue of racially discriminatory jury selection
procedures. In Brooks v. Beto73 the court of appeals held constitu-
tional the purposeful inclusion of blacks on grand and petit juries.
While expressly disavowing the use of deliberate inclusion to secure
71. E.g., Gaston County v. United Ctates, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), in which Mr.
Justice Harlan, after accepting as true the county's claim that voter registration
tests were impartially applied and that significant strides had been taken towards
equalizing and integrating the county school system, continued: ". . . [these claims]
fall wide of the mark. Affording today's Negro youth equal educational opportunities
will doubtless prepare them to meet, on equal terms, whatever standards of literacy
are required when they reach voting age. It does nothing for their parents, however.
From this record we cannot escape the sad truth that throughout the years Gaston
County systematically deprived its black citizens of the educational opportunities it
granted to its white citizens. 'Impartial' administration of the literacy test today
would serve only to perpetuate these inequities in a different form." Id. at 296-97;
cf. notes 20 and 39 supra.
72. See Kuhn, supra note 26, at 315-22.
73. 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).
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proportional representation, 4 the court vigorously advocated inten-
tional inclusion as the only effective and immediate means of eradicat-
ing "this terrible blight of racial discrimination. '7 5 In Rabinowitz v.
United StatesF6 the same court ruled that the federal jury selection
statute 7 required federal juries to represent a fair cross-section of the
community, and stated that "[i]f a fair cross-section is consistently lack-
ing, then, without more, it is established that the commissioners have
failed in their duty."78
In both of these cases, the Fifth Circuit court of appeals justified
its decision not as an extension of Supreme Court holdings but as an
implementation of principles frequently acknowledged by the Court.
While the decision in Rabinowitz was based primarily on the federal
jury selection statute, the court's reasoning would appear to apply
with equal vigor to state jury selection procedures, since as the court
pointed out, the concept of a representative jury is fundamental to the
jury system as a whole.79
Perhaps because of its intense familiarity with the problem of ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection, the Fifth Circuit may be in the
best position to formulate solutions to the problem; if so, perhaps the
Fifth Circuit has supplied the lead which will be followed by the
courts. Indeed, the Carmical opinion, in which Judge Hufstedler
quoted and cited as authority several Fifth Circuit decisions, indi-
cates that the Ninth Circuit already has, at least partially, followed the
Fifth Circuit's example and interpretation of Supreme Court decisions.
Conclusion
The decision in Carmical v. Craven0 moves the Ninth Circuit
a step closer to implementing the constitutional ideal that the jury
should represent a cross-section of the community. Even though a nar-
row interpretation of Carmical may be taken to condone racially im-
balanced jury lists by allowing the state to justify such a disparity with
a showing of relevant, impartial screening devices, the uncertainty as
to just what will be viewed by the courts as an accurate, objective
74. "[This awareness of race] must never, simply never, be applied to secure
proportional representation." Id. at 24.
75. Id.
76. 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967).
77. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970). Section 1861 provides in part: "It is the
policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury
shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.
78. 366 F.2d at 58 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 44-45.
80. 451 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1971).
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test will likely lead jury officials to ensure that the jury lists are racially
balanced. To do otherwise would constitute a gamble on what the
court will find to be a valid test. The dilemma facing jury officials
under the Carmical holding is obvious. A selection procedure which
is today believed to be valid may, a year or ten years from now, be
declared unconstitutional-thereby exposing all convictions during this
period to collateral attack. The safest way out of the dilemma, and
perhaps the way suggested by Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the equal protection clause, is to develop selection procedures which
produce jury lists reflecting a cross-section of the community.
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